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FAITH AND AUTHENTICITY:
KIERKEGAARD AND HEIDEGGER
ON EXISTING IN 'CLOSEST CLOSENESS'
TO THE NOTHING
Travis O'Brian
Heidegger accuses Christian faith of closing off any possible authentic relation to the nothingness of Dasein. But this paper aims to show how
Kierkegaard's portrayal of faith in Works of Love is of a relation to a 'nothingness' even more profound (groundless) than the 'relative' or 'inunanent'
nothingness described in Heidegger's analysis of anxiety. My argument
centres on the role of desire in the constitution of the self. Heidegger rejects
desire as having any ontological import for Dasein. But Kierkegaard understands faith to be a "transformation" of desire (eros) - a transformation in
which the self relates to the nothing in a way that both demands a concrete
ethics and provides a psychologically more plausible motivation to "bring
death as close as possible" than does authenticity.

In his essay An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger says "Anyone for

whom the Bible is divine revelation has the answer to the question 'Why
are there essents rather than nothing?' even before it is asked."1 Such a
person thus either fails to ask "the question of all authentic questions"2 or, if
the believer does ask it, then he must "suspend" or risk his faith in doing
so. The implication is twofold. First, the philosopher's question, "why are
there essents rather than nothing?" has a deep priority over the question of
faith. Secondly, since for Heidegger faith is always faith in the god who
first of all "is,"3 hence a being among beings, faith is thus a kind of comportment which closes one off from the anxious possibility of nothingness
(as well as the philosophical questioning that arises from it).
Consequently, as far as the analytic of Dasein is concerned, this means,
above all, that the commitment of faith is, if it is one's first commitment, a
form of inauthentic existence.
Heidegger contrasts the "security" of faith4 with the "daring" of authentic Dasein5 for the most part because he thinks that only authentic Dasein
risks the possibility of the Nothing in a radical way. But I want to suggest
here that Kierkegaard's understanding of the paradoxical centrality of love
in the constitution of the self challenges us to a faith that not only meets
Heidegger's own criteria for "authentic existence," but may in fact demand
a more concentrated way of relating to the Nothing than that of which
Dasein's own understanding (or: projection) is capable and, as a result,
avoids the risk of abstraction to which authenticity falls prey. Along with
this basic proposition, I will try to show why faith provides a better answer
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than does authenticity to the question why one should choose to relate oneself to oneself in terms of nothingness.
The question of the meaning of authenticity is a massive one and already
some of the limits of my discussion should be becoming apparent. 6 What
concerns me here is the purely existential question of Dasein's relation to
the nothing and how existing Dasein is able to maintain itself in this relation. I am not, for one thing, concerned here with the ontological question
of Dasein's being as "uncoveredness." Rather, the aspect of authenticity
upon which I will focus is Dasein's relation to the nothing in terms of its
own self-relation and correspondingly of the nothing in terms of self-understanding and ultimate possibility - in short, of authenticity defined as a possible mode of existing in what Heidegger calls the "closest closeness" (Die
niichste Niihe) to death as a possibility.7 In Being and Time, Heidegger offers
many different ways to consider the meaning of authentic Dasein's existentiell relation to the nothing, such as "becoming guilty," or "wanting to have
a conscience," or "a readiness for anxiety." But for the purposes of this
paper, this notion of existing in "closest closeness" to the nothing is perhaps
the clearest and best, if only because it refers more obviously to Heidegger's
existential agenda than to his ontological one.
The place to begin such a discussion would seem to be with a comparison of the experience of anxiety as presented by Kierkegaard and
Heidegger. Indeed, anxiety is for both writers an experience within existence that brings the self to the most intimate region of itself. Anxiety is
therefore shown as the experience which delivers the self over to itself,
over to the nothingness of the self, hence as a kind of opportunity for a
"transformation" or "modification" of the self's self-relation - out of an
ignorance or forgetfulness, and toward the possibility of becoming oneself
in truth. Furthermore, for both Kierkegaard and Heidegger the experience
of anxiety reveals that becoming oneself means: to be essentially related to
oneself as an impossibility, an impossibility which the self, if it is to become
itself in truth, must then relate to as its "ownmost" possibility. Faith and
authenticity are, each for its own proponent, the mode of existing in which
the self maintains itself in this relation to its truth in the most passionate or
resolute way.
In order to conceptualize the fundamental difference between
Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's analyses of anxiety, we therefore must
examine how each treats these key concepts of "possibility" and "impossibility" and determine how these relate to "nothingness." Formally speaking, the term "possibility" operates in a similar, three-tiered manner in
both. First, "possibility" refers to what Heidegger calls "ontic affairs," simply the possibility to be or to do this or that. Marriage, for example, is one
such possibility that I have either chosen or got myself into. This more
familiar use of the term will not be of central concern here. Secondly, the
ontological significance of the term "possibility" begins by conceiving of
the self as, in Kierkegaard's language, characterised by "being able," and in
Heidegger's language as being the "potentiality for Being"B - both of which
indicate an essential freedom. To exist authentically is to relate to oneself as
a sheer being-possible, free to be one's own "end."9 Thirdly, "possibility"
also signifies this" end," freedom's for what? Formally speaking,
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Heidegger and Kierkegaard agree that freedom points toward a kind of
"completion" of existence, a "being-whole," or "unity with oneself."l0
The difference between the two thinkers becomes clearer when we tum
to their respective definitions of "impossibility." Nevertheless, similarities
enough remain even here. Both, for example, describe "impossibility" as
inescapable finitude or radical "unfree dam" in which the self's ability to be
itself comes to or is at an "end." Both furthermore describe existence as
suffering this moment of unfreedom at two 'points:' behind, the self is subject to a moment of genetic inability in which it is "delivered over" to or
"given" to itself to-be, a givenness which Heidegger calls Dasein's "thrown
facticity" and for which Kierkegaard adopts the Hegelian terminology of
"immediacy;" ahead, this suffering is spoken by each as the phenomenon of
"death." Both, thus, conceive of existence as emerging out of and moving
toward "nothing," a "nothingness" they interpret phenomenologically as
that over which the self has no ability, that which the self cannot appropriate for itself.
For neither thinker, of course, does the "end" of all possibility, "death,"
denote merely the biological 'end' of life. But their fundamental disagreement over what anxiety reveals to be constitutive structures of the self is
highlighted by what each proposes to be the 'freest' response to this
'unfreedom.' According to Being and Time, anxiety reveals that Dasein's
possibility is impossibility: "death" indicates that Dasein's freedom (possibility) is not for a certain, pre-determined possibility ('end'), but that freedom consists in Dasein's being-delivered-over to itself precisely as nothing
to-be." For Heidegger, Dasein's "task," at least insofar as there is something like "authenticity" to be won, is to uncover its Being-possible for
nothing; Dasein is the being that is able to understand or "project" itself as
Being on the ground of a "nullity." Dasein is capable of its nothingness, able
to stand-under the burden of its ownmost impossibility.
But for Kierkegaard, in contrast, the self is, by itself, completely incapable
of becoming adequate to itself, incapable, that is, of its 'being' (conceived as
"unity with oneself"). Why the self is not capable of itself is a complex
question that cannot be adequately addressed here, but it involves
Kierkegaard's interpretation of "sin." Unlike Heidegger's analysis of
"thrown fadicity," in Kierkegaard's view the self is not necessarily oriented toward its telos; the self does not necessarily have its being as its "ownmost" concern. Rather, sin is a "leap" in which the self strives to take possibility into its own hands and, by doing so, to posit itself as the 'ground'
and measuring task of existence. "Impossibility" means for Kierkegaard
that the self is not able to achieve its "unitary" self; the self cannot appropriate its origin ex nihilo and "death" is the final seal of this end of possibility,
for death comes between the self and its self-posited telos.
According to Kierkegaard, therefore, there is a constitutional break in the
self; the self cannot relate itself to itself (to its possibility) in a direct way.
Kierkegaard's language of the "leap of passion" indicates just this: the self
must first of all relate to impossibility (nothingness) as the only possible site
for a resurrection of possibility (the "possibility for possibility"12). This fundamental and constantly recurring failure of the project of autonomy finds
'positive' expression in Kierkegaard's famous formulation of the self as "a
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derived, constituted relation ... which relates itself to itself and in relating
itself to itself relates itself to another." Notice that whereas for Heidegger
the self is capable of its "wholeness," so that Being-in-the-world/Being-forothers does not mark a break in the self (this being exactly the point whereat Levinas concentrates his criticism), for Kierkegaard the "another" refers
to such an irrecoverable break - a moment of impossibility or passivity to
which the self must relate, must strive to incorporate into itself, in the
process of becoming itself. This active passivity, or passive activity, is love
- which begins (in sin) as that kind of self-love which Kierkegaard calls passion, and which the tradition (both theological and philosophical) calls eros
or desire. Passion is thus the self's existential drive to resolve the impossibility (or nothingness) of itself by way of the (foreign) possibility that is
dialectically inseparable from it.
With this introduction to Kierkegaard's concept of eros, the central line
of my argument begins to emerge. The difference between Kierkegaard
and Heidegger's analyses of anxiety comes down to this: that whereas for
Heidegger anxiety reveals that Dasein's possibility is impossibility, nothing
further and nothing more, for Kierkegaard, in contrast, anxiety reveals a
fundamental doubleness in the self - that the self can become conscious of
itself as an impossibility only because it is equiprimordially given to itself
as an ultimate possibility. For Kierkegaard, accordingly, passionate selfawareness is, negatively speaking, the awareness of oneself as an impossibility; but positively speaking, it is the awareness that this impossibility is
indirectly possible, mediated by and "with the help of" another - and that
love (and neither "projection" nor "understanding") is the 'medium' which
makes this mediation possible.
It safe to suppose that it is just because Heidegger does not discover a
break in the circle of the self's relation to itself that he ignores 'love' or
'desire' as having any structural significance for Dasein. But we must then
tum our attention to this 'medium' as it operates in Kierkegaard's work.
Passion, as he understands it, is the desire to solve the riddle of the self's
impossibility. But Kierkegaard further defines "despair" as the self's
attempt to solve this riddle by relating to 'otherness' within the pale of
immanence alone - either by relating itself to itself aesthetically, ethically,
or immanent-religiously. Each of these "stages" of existence may be
defined in the 'existentiell' terms of how the self relates to itself by relating
to others. The aesthetic individual relates himself abstractly to others,
using others simply as occasions for his particular enjoyment and a means
to escape ennui. The ethical self, on the other hand, relates to the other as
an occasion to express the universal. According to Kierkegaard, the ethical
personality does not treat others truly as ends-in-themselves because the
ethical is still a matter of expressing one's own possibility; the ethical person's relations to others remains in the context of a self-relation, that is, of
an interest in becoming oneself.13 Lastly, the immanent-religious individual
relates himself in resignation to others. From this perspective, no possible
relation to another can have any ultimate (eternal) significance because the
immanent-religious person, in guilt-consciousness, realizes the infinite
depth of his impossibility. Consciousness of "guilt" is the consciousness
tllat one cannot finally appropriate the nothingness of existence. But (and
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this is where the immanent-religious differs from Heidegger's authenticity), the immanent-religious self does not relate to itself quite as a sheer
impossibility, for consciousness of the self's impossibility can be brought to
light, as we have seen, only in dialectical relation to possibility. Therefore,
although the immanent-religious individual is "now distanced from (his
being-possible in any ultimate sense) as much as possible ... he still relates
himself to it,"l4 for if he did not, he could not retain the consciousness of
guilt by which he, the immanent-religious individual, relates himself to
himself, defines himself.
It is most important to note that all three of these (despairing) stages are
characterized by self-love (passion, infinite self-interest).l5 In all three, every
instance of relating to another is a means by which the self relates to itself,
or is at least a reflection of this self-relation. Thus, if the self is not to exist
in a state of despair, if the self in the passion of inwardness is to relate to
itself in truth as an impossible possibility, then its self-love must undergo
what Kierkegaard calls "the transformation of the etemal."l6 In this transformation, the other is no longer related to in terms of what, in the vocabulary of Works of Love, Kierkegaard calls personal inclination or "preference." This means that the other is no longer related to self-referentially;
the relationship is no longer an immediate reflection of the self's relationship to itself. A beloved who is loved without such an immediate self-reference can only be, as we shall see, the neighbour.
Before we begin to explore the meaning of this "transformation," we
should return for a moment to Heidegger, from whose path, with this talk
of love and desire, we seem to have wandered irrecoverably. I do not, in
fact, believe the word" desire" appears even once in the whole of Being and
Time. Nevertheless, at one point he hypothetically suggests that we may
speak of the "not-yet" of Dasein in terms of Ausstand - of a lack in Dasein
that is yet to be paid, a debt that is "still outstanding." His final rejection of
such terminology we may take to be his official rejection of "desire" as an
essential structure of existence. Heidegger tells us that "this being-missing
(we can read: "lack") as still-outstanding (read: the debt that must be paid if
one is to fill a constitutional lack in the self), cannot by any means define
ontologically that 'not-yet' which belongs to Dasein." Why not? Because
"Dasein does not have ... the kind of Being of something ready-to-handwithin-the-world ... (Dasein's existence) is not constituted by a 'continuing' piecing-on of entities which, somehow and somewhere, are ready-tohand in their own right."l7 In other words, Heidegger rejects desire as having an essential role in the constitution of Dasein because he believes that
the logic of desire is objectifying, makes an "object" of Dasein. As this
quote implies, if Dasein desires, it must desire some-thing, ready-to-hand.
But some-thing cannot satisfy Dasein's "not-yet," for Dasein's "not-yet" is
not something that can be paid off in this way.
Yet Heidegger does not reject the language of desire simply because no
object can satisfy it - so far, the tradition is in agreement. He rejects such
language rather because he believes it to be irremediably objectifying - in
other words, inescapably linked to the philosophy of substance and the
logic of "perfection." According to the tradition, desire begins in a lack.
But according to Heidegger, there is no "lack" in Dasein. A lack presup-
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poses a fullness, just as a failure presupposes there is something to be won.
But the whole effort of Being and Time, we know, is to reject this "something." Hence, Dasein's "not-yet" does not signal a failure in itself:
Dasein's Being is "not-yet," nothing more. Dasein's only "fullness" or
"perfection" is death; Dasein's "end," we have seen, is death.
Are we forced, then, to agree that Kierkegaard's treatment of the self simply falls prey to Heidegger's criticism and rejection of the traditional categories? The remainder of this paper shall be taken up for the most part with
considerations which I hope will prevent too hasty an assent. For I believe
that Heidegger's sweeping rejection of the logos of desire, if it does not
make the possibility of existence itself less conceivable, it at least makes the
plausibility of Dasein's choosing itself in terms of authenticity less urgent,
less forceful. Furthermore, a closer inspection of what Kierkegaard means
by desire, and especially of what he calls "the transformation of desire by
the eternal"18 (which we now unveil as "faith"), might, I suggest, both have
rid Heidegger of some of his prejudice against a faith which exists in "closest closeness" to the Nothing, and might also have helped to solve some of
the difficulties involved in his notion of "becoming authentic."
The first consideration then, asks why Dasein should choose the "modification" of existence that is authenticity. The Nothing calls Dasein to
authenticity in the phenomenon of conscience. But is "nothing" enough to
elicit an authentic response? In other words, is the nothing which calls
enough to evoke responsibility, even in the sense of Dasein's being-responsible for itself? Is it possible to be responsible to nothing? I wonder if this is
not, anthropologically or psychologically at least, entirely incorrect. I wonder whether it is not necessary for there to be another that one is responsible to for there to be a reason to be responsible even for oneself.
Perhaps it is possible to argue that Heidegger here has the "nothing"
function in a way similar to the way in which the "another" functions in
Kierkegaard, at least in the sense that it is "other" than the Being of Dasein.
Accordingly, there are commentators who speak of Dasein's "ontological
obligation,"19 the full recognition and acceptance of which defines authenticity. But not only can "obligation" here at best be meant metaphorically,
but in a strange way Heidegger's nothing is not even "other" enough to
take the place of Kierkegaard's "another" in this manner. For as is witnessed by the expression "no-thing," Heidegger speaks of a nothing that is
relative to Being, and relative even to the "there" of Being which is Dasein.
The question, again, is whether nothing, and especially this "relative nothing" (the Greek me on) is enough to summon Dasein to authenticity, or
whether, if responsibility is never more than to oneself (and if assuming a
self is even possible under such conditions - an assumption Kierkegaard
refuses), there can be a satisfying answer to the question: Why be authentic? Why should I choose to risk the pain and disorientation of anxiety
when I can lead a full life involved in the community and busy with whatever task is at hand, with things that need doing?
I am aware that many would argue that these concerns are misplaced
because they are based upon anthropological or psychological considerations. But if the ontological, existentialleyel does not accord with the existentiell, lived level - if, that is, what is demonstrated to be necessary in life
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is not provided for on the structural level, we may then assume that the
structural level as given by Heidegger remains, at the least, incomplete. 21l
At any rate, for the moment we must leave this as an open question to
Heidegger. But that it remains a question is enough, for our purpose at
least, to stay the Heideggerian criticism that this "another" which
Kierkegaard includes in the structure of the self renders inauthentic the
individual who orients his existence in terms of it. For such an "other" just
may make authentic existence possible - or, if this thesis proves too strong,
just may at least render authenticity of far more pressing exigency.
Nevertheless, at this point I seem to have painted myself into an
unnegotiable corner: somehow, I have managed to say that to exist in
"closest closeness" to the nothing, it may be necessary to orient one's existence in terms of "another." Since, presumably, "another" is not nothing,
does my argument not collapse into absurdity? Here we must turn to the
crucial question and main thrust of my discussion: what is "faith" according to Kierkegaard, and how does this faith permit us to exist both in "closest closeness" to the nothing while, paradoxically, facing the radical
"another" dwelling in the intimate self?
As a prolegomena to the positive exposition of the meaning of faith in
Kierkegaard, and in order to intercept a few potential misunderstandings, I
should mention a couple of things which faith is not. First of all, faith is not
an intellectual assent to a set of doctrines. This does not mean that
Kierkegaard rejects the Church as an authority, but it is not to the church
that the self relates when it relates itself to God in faith. Secondly and
more importantly, faith is not a belief in some-thing that first of all "is" not, at least, in terms of a "what." Thus Kierkegaard says, "God himself is
this: how one involves himself with Him.... In respect to God, the how is
the what."21 Faith is this "how" one involves oneself with God (whose corresponding "what" we will discover below). In other words, Christianity
is a striving. 22
How, then, goes this striving? How is faithful existence? Of the many
formulations that Kierkegaard gives in answer to this question, I choose one
as exemplary: the faithful individual is he whose passion takes the form of a
Duty to be in the Debt of Love to Each Other.23 In the unpacking of this formulation that follows, I ask only that the reader listen for the way in which the
self, in faith, actively comports itself in a "closest closeness" to nothing.

Our Duty To Be in the Debt of Love to Each Other
According to the existential logic unfolded in the drama of the stages, the
individual is prepared for genuine Christian faith only once he comes to
understand, in guilt-consciousness, that he cannot provide himself with the
condition wherein he could become adequate to himself. In guilt-consciousness, as I have already explained, the individual comes to realize the
impossibility of any final positive appropriation of the nothingness of the
self into himself. The very structure of existence (understood by AntiClimacus as the state of sin) prevents him from achieving such adequation.
It is only at this point, a point which Kierkegaard often describes in terms
of a kind of mystic "dark night,"24 that the self is broken enough to accept,
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in his need, that although he cannot give himself this condition, there is
another, an impossible (paradoxical) other who can. To accept this condition, that one's ownmost possibility is possible only in relation to an
impossible other, is to give the responsibility for self-adequation over to this
other. The promise of final adequation is the incarnation of Jesus, the
Christ, and faith is thus the passive activity of accepting the given promise
and responding to it by giving one's passionate self-interest (read: existence)
over to Him. This activity of 'handing over' is itself an abysmal striving,
never complete. The existential, erotic striving for one's ownmost possibility is thus here transformed into a striving to empty oneself of this self-interest (but, note, while remaining dialectically interested in it - for if one loses
the interest, the motivation to empty oneself of it also vanishes) by giving it
up to Him who is the last hope but also the promise of an eternal possibility (Salighed). This 'handing-over' is the "how" of faithful existence, and
this "transformation" of existence (in distinction from the term "modification" used by Heidegger) begins with the recognition of duty.
What is duty? The kind of duty spoken of here is not the ethical duty to
express the universal in one's existence - a duty which, we saw, does not
escape the autonomy of self-interest. Rather, Christian duty is assumed as a
"task" which does not originate within the self, but which, nevertheless, the
self recognizes and appropriates Jar itself, as its "ownmost" task. In duty,
therefore, a displacement of the autonomy of the self occurs?' In assuming
Christian duty, the individual recognizes that his own possibility to-be is in
fact not his own (or vice versa, what is not his own the self recognizes to be
his ownmost). Thus the self (paradoxically, and thus by way of an uncertain
leap) gives itself to itself by giving itself over to the authority of another.
In the passion of faith, of recognizing the necessity of duty, the self is
indeed set back in radical finitude. Faithful existence is far from relating
oneself to oneself on the ground of a false security in being. Yet as we have
seen, self-conscious finitude necessarily expresses a doubleness: both
impossible and possible. In the passionate language of faith, the impossibility is understood as the profound "I can't," the ultimate vanity of the self
- that "before God, I am nothing."26 The possible, on the other hand, freedom,
is transformed into the fortitude to maintain oneself in the call of duty. In
faith then, what does duty call the self to hold itself into? Debt. It is our
duty to be in debt.
Striking. Here Kierkegaard is apparently advocating precisely that
which we have seen Heidegger reject - that is, thinking of the nothing that
anxiety brings to the surface of existence in terms of a debt to be paid, in
terms of "something still outstanding." But there remains a difference nevertheless. This difference does not lie in Kierkegaard's claim that the debt
is an "infinite debt," for this claim, left merely as such, would not escape
the objectifying logic of filling a lack, but would only defer the completion
of the payment indefinitely. The difference rather lies in the fact that now,
in its transformed mode, the self actually desires to be in debU7 We saw
that Heidegger rejected the language of debt because according to him this
language inevitably presupposes a philosophy of perfection and fulfillment. But Kierkegaard turns this language on its head. The everyday or
natural state of human being indeed exists in the hope of such fulfillment,
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but as such, it is in a state of despair - despair because forgetful of, even
fleeing from, the impossibility or nothingness of its existence.28 But faith,
the "transformation" of this everyday state (which it thereby presupposes),
does not seek perfection.29 Thus Kierkegaard emphatically does not say it
is our duty to repay the debt, but to-be in it: the task of faithful existence is
no longer to resolve the debt, but to maintain oneself in it. As such, the
debt can no longer be conceived strictly as a debt (or lack) of being.
One way to understand this is that, with the transformation of passion
which is faith, the self no longer has its own being as its first "issue." Its
being is no longer its ownmost concern. In the untransformed, purely
immanent mode of existence, passion responds to the debt as a debt in the
self's being and seeks to overcome it. But faith, the transformation of that
passion, understands that the only way out of the debt is through the debt
because only and precisely at the place of the break in the self, where the
self discovers its impossibility, can the self begin to relate itself at the same
time to an impossible (absurd) "possibility for possibility." The self therefore desires to stay in debt and not to resolve or repay it; passion is no
longer directly and in the first place concern for the self's own being. On
one level it remains this, of course, but only obliquely. Now one's own
existence is no longer the 'direct' focus of one's concern. Rather, the 'goal'
of self-interest breaks through the tyranny of the dilemma "to be or not to
be" as the only two possible options.
When the self desires to be in debt, then it no longer relates to the debt as
a debt of being, but rather as a debt of love. Already situated self-understandingly in the ultimate relativity of being/nothing, when the self in
faith desires to be in debt, it no longer relates itself to itself as something to
become; the source of the restlessness of existence it now understands in
terms other than a lack of being. The transformation of desire thus lifts
desire out of the logic of fulfillment (perfection) so that it henceforth strives
to express a relation to a more fundamental abyss. And with this we have
discovered "what" God is, according to Kierkegaard, in terms of "how" we
relate to Him: we relate to God as nothing, the abyss of love. 3D
Furthermore, we venture to say that this "nothing" is a more abysmal
nothing than that of which Heidegger speaks because it does not focus on
the "to be or not to be." The nothing here is not relative to being. It is,
rather, the Greek ouk on, to which theology refers in the ex nihilo of
creation.3! (God is the afgrund whose self-generated Word loves creation
into life and death.)
To love God in faith is to actively take up nothing as the task of existence. But if this is so, can we conceive of love as anything more than a
pure abstraction? The quote we are now investigating does not equivocate; the activity of love cannot be more concrete: it is our Duty To Be in the
Debt of Love to Each Other. In this lito each other" we hear the command
to love your neighbour. Thus when Kierkegaard says that the faithful self
strives to give its existence away to another, the other who is to receive this
"gift" of the self is not directly God. God is not a tyrant who demands our
existence from us; "God," says Kierkegaard, "demands nothing for himself,
although he demands everything from yoU."32 We give everything away,
become as nothing before God, when we give everything to the neighbour.
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The neighbour, unlike the friend or romantic beloved, is not marked by
anything" distinctive." Without distinction, love for him is not the love of
self-referential preference, but can only be called forth in obedient response
to the duty to love. Thus, the transformation of passion is not in the least
abstract. A command usurps the place of natural, spontaneous inclination
and gives to duty its specific task: to love one's neighbour.
Now, at last having traced this strange, round-a-bout logic, we can conclude. The self in passion for its own impossible possibility to-be,
renounces this concern by taking up the task of becoming nothing - not in
a mystic retreat, but by venturing out again amongst beings - those beings
called "neighbours." Faith, according to Kierkegaard, is to truthfully exist
in "closest closeness" to the nothing. To "relate oneself to God," he says,
"is to become as nothing."33 Herein we see why Kierkegaard's description
of faith provides a psychologically more plausible motivation to suffer an
existence bound in the closest possible relation to nothingness than
Heidegger's description of authenticity (and Kierkegaard, unlike
Heidegger, makes no bones about the fact that such an existence, from a
natural, everyday perspective, is suffering) precisely because to suffer this
way is to respond to God in one's need - or more precisely, is to respond to
the saving invitation of Christ, to become responsible to him.
Furthermore, not only is the "nothing" to which the faithful individual
relates a more abysmal nothing than that to which Heidegger refers,
Kierkegaard has shown how existing in such "closest closeness" is the most
concrete of tasks. For love of one's neighbour is not a feeling, not a "soul
mood," but true love, he says, "is pure action."34 For this very reason, the
"transformation" of existence that is faith does not suffer from the danger to
which the "modification" of authenticity is prone - the danger of being
overly vague, abstract. Authenticity, in the end, is merely a modification of
the understanding, perhaps a kind of more intense vision given in an intimate rapport with the fragility of Being. But as Patricia Huntington has
asked, "Where does authentic resolve deliver me? ... Heeding the call of
conscience proves empty.... This 'moment of vision' is purely formal,
abstract, 'indefinite'."35
If Heidegger had not been blinded by his preoccupation with sweeping
the whole tradition away as "onto-theology," I wonder if he then might
have been more open to that part of the Christian tradition which does not
conceive of God in the first place in terms of ''being'' - as the god which
first of all "is." Perhaps he would then have been more open to the possibility of faith as a mode of existing which relates to itself always in terms of
its own nothing to-be. 36
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